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21. INTRODUCTION
In mid-1995 Tunisia made the strategic choice of becoming the first country in the
Middle East and North African region to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the
European Union (EU). In 1996, the authorities launched a vast industrial restructuring
program ("programme de mise-à-niveau") aimed at helping Tunisian firms bridge the gap
between their current performance and the benchmark performance of their trading
partners by upgrading productive capacity and human capital. The program targeted to
restructure 2000 enterprises by the end of 2001 out of 4000 potential candidates.
This program followed the structural adjustment program that was put into place in 1986
and was designed to progressively dismantle the many controls on resource allocation, to
privatize state-controlled enterprises, and to moderate the growth in aggregate demand.
In the 1980s Tunisia was a country plagued with unemployment as high as 15%, a
budgetary deficit of 5.2 %, a continuously deteriorating current account deficit, and a
large and inefficient public sector, in other words, dim prospects for future development.
We shall analyze the evolution of the potential of the Tunisian economy from 1983 to
1996 using a general equilibrium model. By using an activity analysis model and yearly
data on the input-output structure of the Tunisian economy and its endowments of labor
and capital, we shall determine by how much each year the Tunisian economy could have
increased its level of domestic final demand expenditures (current consumption and
investments in future consumption) and determine its weakness and potentialities that the
program of "mise-à-niveau" could solve or reinforce.
3Labor is subdivided into five levels of qualification, where the bottom three (manual
workers, machine operators, and foremen) are assimilated to unqualified labor and the top
two (technicians and engineers/administrators) correspond to qualified labor. The model
allows us to measure the scarcity of each type of labor. The model also determines the
sectors where Tunisia has a comparative advantage in tradable commodities. We shall
compare the structure and the performance of the Tunisian economy before and after the
structural adjustment program of 1986.
In the modern theory of economic growth, research capital, and human capital play a
central role (see Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman, (1991)).
Empirical studies, mostly confined to countries of the OECD area, have shown that
indeed research and development earn a high rate of return ( see the surveys by Griliches
(1995), Mohnen (2001). As reliable data on R&D are lacking for Tunisia, we cannot test
the effect of innovation on the growth performance in Tunisia. Regarding human capital,
generally proxied by education, case studies are more convincing than econometric
studies (see Schultz (1999) and Pissarides (2000)). Estimates are often insignificant and
sensitive to variations in measurement and specification (see Topel (1999), Krueger and
Lindahl (2001) and Kalatzidakis et al. (2001)).  For Tunisia, instead of using data on
labor by level of education, we use data on labor by type of qualification, which can be
considered as the output of education and job training. We can therefore evaluate the
marginal social value of qualified versus unqualified labor and their respective
contributions to output growth.
4The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our activity analysis model
and explain its main properties. In section 3, we retrace the evolution of factor utilization
in Tunisia between 1983 and 1996. In section 4, we analyze the evolution of optimal
factor allocations and corresponding factor prices before and after the structural
adjustment program. In particular, we compute a rate of return on qualified labor. In
section 5, we report the results of a series of experiments with different scenarios to
assess the sensitivity of our results. We conclude in section 6 by summarizing the main
conclusions and by drawing some lessons from the Tunisian example with the structural
adjustment program. The data sources and constructions are described in an appendix.
52. THE MODEL
Suppose a social planner who knows the production structure, technologies, preferences
and factor endowments of his economy, and wants to allocate resources and production in
such a way as to maximize the level of domestic final demand, which thus includes
present consumption and investment towards future consumption, both public and
private. We consider a small open economy where we allow the trade deficit to equal the
observed deficit.
Formally, the efficient state of the economy is obtained by solving the following linear
programming problem:
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The decision variables are the level of domestic final demand (t), the sectoral activity
levels (s) and net exports (g). They are determined so as to maximize domestic final
demand subject to three sets of constraints. The first set are the commodity balances (1)
which stipulate that net production in each sector has to be sufficient to satisfy domestic
final demand and net exports. The second set, (2) to (7), states that the inputs used in each
sector may not exceed total disposable inputs. Capital is taken to be sector-specific. In
7other words, we assume putty-clay technologies. Once installed in one sector, capital
cannot be disassembled and affected somewhere else. A sectoral capital constraint is
binding when a sector reaches full capacity utilization. For labor, we distinguish five
different types, each corresponding to a certain level of qualification and expertise.
Workers can always be affected to jobs requiring lower but not higher qualifications. For
example, the work requiring administrators and engineers can only be fulfilled by
workers possessing their type of qualifications whereas the work normally done by
technicians can also be fulfilled by engineers. Part of the labor force is affected to the
non-business sector, which essentially comprises services directly consumed by final
demand (government services, services provided by non-profit institutions). The last
constraint (8) posits that the trade deficit at optimal activity levels may not exceed the
observed trade deficit. To increase their level of consumption, Tunisians can import from
abroad, but only up to a certain level, which is conservatively taken to be the observed
trade deficit. Without constraint (8), Tunisia could reach an infinite value for its objective
function by importing without limits.1 The assumption of a small open economy with
exogenous world prices for the tradable commodities is not unrealistic in the case of
Tunisia.
The observed activity levels correspond to the following values: t=1, s=e, and
D = -p’(V’e-Ue-f)T. The observed state of the economy is thus our point of reference.
Efficiency derives from full capacity utilization, optimal factor allocations across sectors,
and international specialization. Variations of this model appear in ten Raa and Mohnen
                                                
1 The observed trade balance is introduced as a factor of production, as in the work by Diewert and
8(1994), ten Raa (1995) and ten Raa and Mohnen (2000). This model could also be seen as
a macroeconomic DEA (“data envelopment analysis”) model, that determines the
economy’s frontier given its technologies, preferences and endowments (see ten Raa and
Mohnen (2000) for more discussion on this point). But it is not a benchmarking exercise
with respect to a best technology as most DEA analyses are. It should also be noticed that
our analysis is of a short-term nature, in the sense that the optimal resource allocation that
underlies the optimal solution of our activity analysis is dependent on the observed levels
of technology. We do not model technological change nor changes in preferences and
endowments.
The decomposition of labor into five levels of qualification sheds some light onto the
kind of labor shortages Tunisia has been facing and on the returns to innovation.
The solution of the linear program above yields not only a picture of resource allocations
in an efficient economy, but also of the prices sustaining such an equilibrium resource
allocation. To see this, consider the dual programming problem
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Morrison (1986) and Kohli (1991).
9where p, w, r and e are respectively the shadow prices of commodities, of the five types
of labor, of the sectoral capital stocks, and of the trade deficit. By the theorem of
complementary slackness, a shadow price is positive only if the corresponding constraint
in the primal is binding. The shadow prices w and r denote the marginal values of an
additional unit of the respective inputs. If at a certain level of qualification the labor
constraint is tight, it earns a markup over the previous level of qualification. A sector with
less than full capacity utilization earns a zero rate of return on a marginal capital
investment, for the very simple reason that it is in no excess demand, as unused capital is
still available. The shadow price e of the trade balance indicates the marginal value in
terms of attainable domestic final demand of an additional allowed dinar of trade deficit.
By the complementary slackness conditions, it can also be said that a sector is active only
if it makes no loss. The inequalities (9) indicate that at the optimal solution of the linear
program the prices of active sectors equal average cost, and hence that the optimal
solution can be obtained as a competitive equilibrium. Condition (10) is a normalization
condition akin to the choice of a numeraire. By equality (11) domestic prices for tradable
commodities may differ from world prices only by a certain constant e, which can be
interpreted as the exchange rate compatible with the purchasing power parity. All
quantities are expressed in constant dinars, except labor, which is denoted in man-years.
Hence, all shadow prices are relative constant prices, except the shadow prices of labor
which are in constant dinars per man-year.
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3. THE DATA
The data on which we base our analysis are described in appendix 2. The concordance
between industry and commodity classifications is given in appendix A. As table 1
shows, the unemployment rate has always been much higher for the qualified workers
(levels 4 and 5) than for the low qualified workers (levels 1 to 3). For instance, in 1990,
28.7% of the qualified workers were out of work compared to 13.9 % of the less-qualified
workers. From 1987 onwards, about the time when Tunisia adopted the structural
adjustment program, we notice first an increase in the overall rate of capacity utilization,
and second a decrease in the unemployment rate for the qualified workers and an increase
for the less-qualified workers. We notice a persistent shift from manual workers (level 1)
towards machine operators (level 2) over the whole period. Low qualified workers make
up almost 90% of the total work force. There was no major shift of employment
composition among the qualified workers (levels 4 and 5). This high level of
unemployment for qualified workers might seem unreasonable for a country that devotes
a significant proportion of its national resources to human capital accumulation. It can be
explained by the structure of the Tunisian economy. According to a World Bank study
(2000, Vol II, table 2.3, p.6), in 1996, 82.4% of the Tunisian enterprises employed less
than 6 workers while only 1.6% employed more than 100 workers and only a dozen firms
more than 500 workers. We shall now examine what would have been the optimal
allocation of resources in Tunisia for each year between 1983 and 1996.
<insert somewhere here table 1 >
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Optimal resource allocation
In table 2 we present the optimal sectoral activities, i.e. the optimal allocation of
resources in Tunisia, for five selected years. Activity levels with a star indicate full
capacity utilization. For instance, in 1984 agriculture and fishing should have operated at
34% above the observed activity level under optimal allocation of resources. But even at
this activity level, the sector would still not have operated at full capacity. Food
processing would in the same year have reached its full capacity at 125% above observed
activity. Full capacity utilization would also have been reached by construction materials
and glass, mining, the hydrocarbons industry, transport and commerce, hotel and tourism,
and other services. Textile and leather and other manufacturing had better not been
activated.
Glancing at table 2 we notice that textile and leather, and other manufacturing had most
of the time better been disactivated. Electricity, water, and construction and public work
produce non-tradable commodities. They always need to be activated as their
commodities are needed as inputs in other sectors and cannot be imported. They never
reach full capacity though, as their production surplus cannot be exported. Agriculture
and fishing could have increased their level of operation but not at full capacity. They
serve as a cushion sector to hire the labor force in periods of close to full capacity in the
other sectors. The other sectors, food processing, construction material and glass,
mechanical and electrical goods, mining, production of hydrocarbons, transport and
12
communications, hotels and tourism, and other services were ripe for operation at full
capacity levels.
<insert somewhere here table 2 >
4.2. Tunisia’s comparative advantage
Table 2 also reveals the location of Tunisia’s comparative advantage, i.e. the sectors
where Tunisia could specialize and be a net exporter. In the second column for each year
of table 2 we present a sectoral breakdown of all positive net exports at the optimal
allocation of resources. We notice that the strongest potential earners of foreign exchange
are hotel and tourism and other services (including trade and financial services), and to a
lesser extent transport and communication, construction material and glass, and what we
could call the food conglomerate (agriculture, fishing, and food processing). At the
optimal solution, the first two make up for at least two thirds of net exports, transport and
communications account for about 10% of total positive net exports, the food
conglomerate for 15% to 20%, and construction material and glass show a steady net
export of 3% to 4% of the total.  There were no major shifts in comparative advantage
over the years. The sector mechanical and electrical goods should always have been
activated at full capacity but not for generating net exports. So were most of the time
mining and production of hydrocarbons. Here and there they could achieve some net
exports, but they are not real sectors of comparative advantage. They are merely sectors
needed to sustain economic activity.
13
It is interesting to compare the actual and the optimal specialization of the Tunisian
economy in foreign trade (columns 2 and 3 for each year). Textiles and mining show
some foreign trade where there should be none, according to our analysis. In transport
and communications, and in hotel and tourism there is more trade than we would desire.
In other services instead there is insufficient trade. In food processing, construction
materials, and glass and hydrocarbons actual trade patterns tend to move in the right
direction. The most impressive evolution is that of net exports in hydrocarbons, which
steadily declined and ceased to be a net export at the end of our sample as predicted by
our analysis of comparative advantage.
4.3. Efficiency and shadow prices
According to our results, Tunisia could have increased its level of domestic final demand,
our measure of national well-being, by anywhere between 13% and 24% over the various
years (see first column of table 3). The higher the expansion factor, the farther away the
economy was from its optimal factor allocation, hence the less efficient it was. If we take
the years before and after the structural adjustment program of 1986, we notice that the
economy moved closer to its efficiency frontier between 1989 and 1992, but turned less
efficient again from 1993 on, but not to the levels prior to 1986. This result is in line with
the overall evolution of the rate of capacity utilization.
In our model labor is mobile across sectors and gets assigned first to the sector with the
greatest value added until that sector reaches its full capacity, then to the next sector with
14
the greatest value added until this one reaches its full capacity and so on. The wage rate
for a certain type of labor is thus determined by its marginal productivity in the last sector
that is activated. The marginal social value of workers of different qualifications is
reflected in their shadow wages (table 3). In 1983, the availability of one more worker in
the economy could increase its well-being by 1,610 dinars per year. The fact that higher
qualified workers did not potentially earn more than low-qualified workers is equivalent
to saying that there was no room for a wage markup for higher qualifications. This is
indeed what we would expect given the higher unemployment rate for high-qualified
workers. Only in 1988 and then again in 1994, 1995 and 1996 was there a certain
shortage of the L2 type of labor compared to the L1 type. Except for the years 1988 and
1989, we notice a general upward trend in labor value. In 1996, a worker’s contribution
to the economy in categories 2 to 5 was worth 3,410 dinars per year.
As capital is sector-specific, sectors can expand only up to their full capacity. All sectors
with full capacity earn a positive shadow price for their capital stock. Those are the
sectors that were are marked by a star in table 2. The sectors which are either completely
idle or else activated at less than full capacity earn no marginal return on their capital
stock. The weighted average rate of return on physical capital has been dropping from
22% in 1983 to 8% in 1991, and has afterwards risen again to reach 13% in 1996. The
social return on capital was lower after the structural adjustment program showing that
the Tunisian economy invested during this period and reached rates of return closer to the
normal rate. From 1992 on, capital became scarcer again, but not to the extent it was in
1983 and 1984.
15
The purchasing power parity, i.e. the shadow price corresponding to the trade deficit (the
last column in table 3), has moved slightly to the advantage of Tunisia. The lower the
domestic prices compared to the world prices, the more a given foreign trade deficit can
be converted into higher consumption. In 1983, the domestic price level for tradables was
78% of the world price. Since then domestic prices have declined (and hence the
purchasing power parity has strengthened) to end at 73% of the world price in 1996.
< insert somewhere here table 3 >
4.4. Evaluation of the country’s wage bill for qualified workers
If we multiply the number of workers in L4 and L5  by their respective observed wages
(in constant dinars), we obtain the wage bill for qualified workers per sector. We divide
each industry total by the economy’s total to get the decomposition of qualified labor bill
by industry. From the figures reported in table 4 we see that in Tunisia the qualified labor
bill is mainly concentrated in agriculture, textiles and leather, and other services. In 1996,
those three sectors made up almost 64% of the total qualified labor bill. Its ratio to GDP
has been relatively stable over the years, around 6.5%.
< insert table 4 >
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4.5. Rate of return on qualified workers
We calculate the rate of return on qualified workers by dividing the difference between
the optimal and the observed labor bill for labor categories 4 and 5 by the observed labor
bill for those two categories combined:
RRD = (w4L4 + w5L5) / (w4o L4 + w5o L5) - 1
where w4 and w5 are the shadow wage rates and w4o and w5o are the observed wage rates.
In this way, we measure the wage premium above the actual wage that each qualified
worker commands at the optimal allocation of resources. This rate of return is to be
interpreted as a marginal social rate of return, capturing how much the Tunisian economy
given its structure of technology, preferences, and factor endowments is able to increase
its final demand by investing in one more qualified worker. The figures reported in the
bottom row of table 4, which are weighted averages of the sectoral rates of return (with
the observed labor costs as weights), indicate that qualified workers earned a negative
rate of return throughout the sample period.2 3 The marginal value of a highly qualified
worker did not match its actual wage payment. On average the rate of return was –47%
before 1990. It rose to -27% on average between 1990 and 1996. The structural
                                                
2 We have also regressed TFP growth, with pooled data correcting or not for time and sector dummies, on a
constant and the  ratio of the wage bill of qualified workers over sales to get an estimate of the rate of return
on qualified workers. The rate of return was never significant.
3 Negative (even significant) rates of return on human capital of the male gender are reported in the
literature (for example, Caselli et al. (1996), Kalatzidakis et al. (2001).
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adjustment program seems to have had a beneficial effect on the allocative efficiency of
qualified labor.
4.6. Growth decomposition
In table 5, we decompose the growth rate of the optimal level of domestic final demand
into the growth attributable to each factor input. We know from linear programming that
the optimal value of the primal equals the optimal value of the dual. The latter can be
decomposed into the value attributable to each factor of production: the five types of
labor, the physical capital stock, the trade deficit, which can be considered as an input
into the production of domestic final demand in an open economy4. We have computed
the growth rates of optimal domestic final demand and its components over the whole
period and the three sub-periods corresponding to successive five-year plans. As table 5
indicates, the pro-competitive and liberalizing structural adjustment program introduced
in 1986 obviously lead to a substantial growth in domestic final demand. The major
source of growth comes from the increase in the number and rewards of machine
operators. However, the improved growth performance of the Tunisian economy between
the 6th and the 8th five-year plan is almost entirely due to investment in physical capital.
< insert table 5 >
                                                
4 Since t DFD = DKrNw e++ '' , d(t DFD)/(t DFD) = [w’N/t DFD] d(w’N)/(w’N) +
[r’K/t DFD]d(r’K)/(r’K) + [eD/t DFD]d(eD)/(eD).
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5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate to what extent our results depend on some critical assumptions
underlying the model or the data construction, we have made a number of experiments.
To these we now turn.
5.1 Mobility of capital
If we let capital be completely mobile across sectors rather than be sector-specific, the
economy becomes much more flexible in its allocation of resources. It can then
completely specialize in its sectors of comparative advantage, export those commodities
and from the export proceeds import the other needed commodities for production and
consumption. The prices of the tradables sustaining the equilibrium drop sharply and
those of the non-tradables increase as they now become bottlenecks. The optimal
reachable level of domestic final demand is much higher (around 200%). The shadow
wage of the most skilled member of the labor force increases.
5.2 Unemployment by qualifications
We have experimented with three distributions of unemployment across qualifications, a
declining rate of unemployment as we move to higher categories of specialization, an
increasing rate of unemployment and a U-shaped distribution with higher unemployment
rates at both ends. We have made sure that the weighted average unemployment rate is
always consistent with the aggregate observed rate. The more we move towards lower
19
levels of unemployment for a given category, the more the shadow wage in that category
goes up, as we would expect.
5.3 Mobility of labor
We have assumed that a worker of higher qualification can always replace a worker of
lower qualification, but not the opposite. Given this asymmetry in labor mobility, the
wage rates becomes flatter and lower for low levels of qualification, because of more
labor abundance. If we make the model more rigid and allow workers to be qualified for
their own job only, then we obtain quite a different pattern of shadow wage rates. It is
now more likely that each labor qualification experiences some scarcity. We have
recalculated the linear program with a uniform rate of unemployment of 15% across labor
qualifications. The interesting finding is the evolution of labor scarcity over time. Manual
workers, machine operators and foremen earn a non-zero wage rate. Foremen earn the
most. However, the two most qualified categories of labor,  engineers and administrators
are all the time in excess supply. This experiment confirms that the most qualified
members of the workforce are in relative abundance. Their negative rate of return shows
that workers of the two most qualified labor categories get paid above their marginal
social value.
5.4 Rate of capacity utilization
We have experimented with different levels of uniform rates of capacity utilization across
all sectors. As the overall rate of utilization increases more sectors become active. If we
let the rates differ across sectors, some sectors can expand more than others but, by and
20
large, the resource allocation across sectors remains the same. As final demand must
move up in the same proportion for all commodities, the expansion of final demand is
affected by the differential rates of capacity utilization. The optimal expansion of
domestic final demand is more or less determined by a weighted average of the inverse
rates of sectoral capacity utilization, where the weights are the capital stock shares.
However, the pattern of shadow prices stays pretty stable across the various experiments
regarding the sectoral rates of capacity utilization.
To summarize the various experiments, the results are most sensitive to the assumptions
made about factor mobility. As we have modeled labor as being partially mobile and
capital as being sector-specific, the assumptions regarding unemployment by
qualifications have a greater bearing on the results than those made about sectoral
capacity utilization. In our preferred scenario where workers of higher qualifications can
always do lower qualified jobs, we notice over time some scarcity developing at the level
of machine operators but not at higher levels of qualification. If we do not allow
downward mobility of labor in the qualification scales, then the scarcity shows up at the
level of supervisors. The highest qualified workers, engineers and technicians, were never
in short supply.
21
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the structural evolution of the Tunisian economy from 1983 to 1996.
By solving for each year an optimal resource allocation problem, we have located the
sources of strength and the bottlenecks apparent in the Tunisian economy and we have
assessed the possible effects of the structural adjustment program introduced in 1986.
Hotel and tourism and other services (regrouping among others trade and financial
services) are identified as the main sectors of comparative advantage in Tunisia, and to a
lesser extent transport and communication, construction material and glass, and the food
conglomerate (agriculture, fishing, and food processing). Our analysis reveals that
Tunisia reached a higher degree of efficiency in resource allocations during the 7th five-
year plan of development but that the efficiency took somewhat of a reverse turn after
that. Labor demand shifted slightly from lower to higher levels of qualification, raising
their shadow wage rates. The highest qualified workers remained in excess supply
throughout the period. The rate of return on qualified labor was actually negative but
increasing substantially in the second half of our sample period.
 The main aim of the structural adjustment program was to make the Tunisian economy
more competitive. Indeed, we notice an increase in competitiveness, that would even be
more evident if we allowed for more factor mobility. However, competitiveness also
operates through learning, reorganization, adoption of new technologies, and innovation
so that firms can improve their management, decrease their production costs and come up
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with new products. Statistics reveal a high level of unemployment for highly qualified
workers, and our analysis confirms the relative abundance of these types of workers in
the Tunisian economy, and hence their low productivity, that is reflected by negative
rates of return on qualified labor. The tremendous investments in education and job-
training, with a budget share amounting to about 6% of GDP and 17% of government
expenditures, do not come to full fruition if these high-skilled workers remain jobless.
The Tunisian government has to put additional efforts in reducing the unemployment of
its best workers. Only then can education lead to greater growth contributions.
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Appendix I: Nomenclature and symbols
Abbreviations Commodity code Industry
Agric & Fishing 00 Agriculture & Fishing
Food process 10 Food processing
Const material 20 Construction materials & glass
Mechan & Elect 30 Mechanical & Electrical goods
Chem & Rubb 40 Chemical & Rubber products
Text & Leather 50 Textile & Leather products
Other Manuf 60 Other Manufacturing
Mining 65 Mining
Hydrocarbons 66 Hydrocarbons
Electricity 67 Electricity
Water 68 Water
Construction 69 Construction & Public works
Transp &Comm 76 Transport &Communications
Hot & Tourism 79 + 99 Hotels  & Tourism
79 - hotels, coffees and restaurants
99 - tourism and other stays
Other Services 72+ 82 + 85 + 94 Services
72 - commodity trade
82 - financial services and insurance
85 - other market services
94 - non market services
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Appendix II: The data
We make use of the annual input-output tables of Tunisia for the years 1983 to 1996 in
constant 1990 prices. At the 20-sector aggregation level, the tables are expressed in
market prices and not at factor costs. Indirect taxes and subsidies are thus included in the
inter-industry transaction figures. Given the unavailability of labor and capital data at a
sufficient level of detail, we are obliged to aggregate our tables from 20 down to 15
sectors and commodities. The “other services” sector regroups the commodities “trade”
(72), “financial services and insurance” (82), “other market services” (85) and “non-
market services” (94), and is made up of sectors (72), (82) and (85). Tourism regroups
the commodities “hotels and restaurants” (79), and “tourism and other stays” (99), and
represents sector (79). The expenditures of the fake sector “banking services” have been
split between the various sectors in proportion to their consumed banking services
following Ben Slama et al (1996)5.
The V’ make matrix is diagonal implying that one sector produces only one commodity
and that each commodity is produced by one sector only. Production is measured in terms
of commodities and not in terms of sectors. Output includes trade margins, and import
figures include import taxes. For three commodities (electricity, water and public work)
we observe no imports nor exports. Those three commodities are therefore considered as
non-tradables. World prices are measured by a weighted average of the Tunisian export
deflators, under the assumption of competitive world prices.  Labor is divided into five
                                                
5We have also tried an alternative split of banking services assuming a uniform distribution of those expenditures
across all sectors. This construction yielded similar results of the linear program in terms of active sectors and optimal
expansion of domestic final demand.
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types: manual workers, machine operators, supervisors, technicians and administrators
and engineers. Data on employment in the business and the non-business sectors are
taken from employment and population surveys conducted by INS (Institut National de la
Statistique. Rama (1998, table 2, p. 70) provides figures on the number of unemployed
workers registered with “L’Agence Tunisienne de l’Emploi” for three categories,
qualified workers, non-qualified workers, and first-job holders. We regard first-job
holders as non-qualified workers. Qualified workers are attributed to categories 4 and 5
and the non-qualified workers to the first three categories. The unemployment rate is
supposed to be the same for each subcategory. Combining the figures on employed and
unemployed workers, we determine the available labor force by category.6 The total
observed wage bill for all categories of workers is obtained from the national accounts
(I.N.S). The spread between the lowest and highest wages (1 to 5) is supposed to be
uniformly distributed across the five categories. This hypothesis is by and large consistent
with the various estimates of wage differentials by qualification reported by  Morrison
and Talbi (1996, table 4.8).
We use the capacity utilization rates for manufacturing estimated by l’Institut
d’Économie Quantitative (1996). For agriculture and fishing, we assume the rate to be the
                                                
6 The number of unemployed in category i (i=1,…,5) is computed as follows:
ijj
i
ii ururLU ba..))1/((
5
1
å
=
-= , where L stands for the number of employed workers, ur the economy-
wide unemployment rate, ja is the proportion of the total unemployed in group j (where j designates
qualified or low qualified workers, see Rama, 1998), and where jib is the proportion of workers of
category i in group j.
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same as for the food sector. For the other non-manufacturing sectors, we take a capital
stock weighted average of the rates in the manufacturing sectors.
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Table 1
Labor composition, unemployment rates and capacity utilization rates: 1983-1996.
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Labor composition by qualifications (%)
L1+l1 28.5 28.0 27.2 26.8 26.7 26.4 25.8
L2+l2 53.0 53.2 54.0 54.4 54.7 55.1 55.5
L3+l3 8.0 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 8.0 7.9
L4+l4 7.3 7.4 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.8 7.0
L5+l5 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Unemployment rates (%)
L1+l1 11.9 11.2 10.9 11.6 12.4 12.7 13.4
L2+l2 11.9 11.2 10.9 11.6 12.4 12.7 13.4
L3+l3 11.9 11.2 10.9 11.6 12.4 12.7 13.4
L4+l4 28.9 28.0 32.8 32.1 34.0 32.8 30.6
L5+l5 28.9 28.0 32.8 32.1 34.0 32.8 30.6
Average 13.8 13.1 13.5 14.0 15.0 15.0 15.3
Overall capacity utilization rates (%)
62.0 62.0 61.0 62.0 68.0 68.0 71.0
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Table 1 (Con'd)
Labor composition, unemployment rates and capacity utilization rates: 1983-1996.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Labor composition by qualifications (%)
L1+l1 25.5 25.6 25.1 25.0 24.4 24.0 23.7
L2+l2 55.6 55.3 55.6 55.9 56.6 57.0 57.3
L3+l3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.5 7.9
L4+l4 7.0 7.0 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
L5+l5 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Unemployment rates (%)
L1+l1 13.9 14.1 15.5 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
L2+l2 13.9 14.1 15.5 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
L3+l3 13.9 14.1 15.5 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
L4+l4 28.7 28.7 28.9 28.3 28.4 28.3 28.2
L5+l5 28.7 28.7 28.9 28.3 28.4 28.3 28.2
Average 15.5 15.7 15.7 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6
Overall capacity utilization rates (%)
73.0 66.0 72.0 69.0 68.0 68.0 68.0
             Note: Li: employment of qualification i in the business sector
                       li: employment of qualification i in the non-business sector
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Table 2
Optimal activity levels, optimal net exports and observed net exports (selected years).
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996
X B.T
opt
B.T
obs
X B.T
opt
B.T
obs
X B.T
opt
B.T.
obs
X B.T
opt
B.T
obs
X B.T
opt
B.T
obs
Agric & Fishing 1.34 - - 1.35 - - 1.62 2.8 - 1.64 32.7 - 1.11 - -
Food process 2.25* 26.6 - 1.70* 9.8 1.3 1.70* 14.1 - 0.00 - 5.3 1.70* 5.6 -
Const material 2.21* 3.8 - 1.68* 1.9 - 1.68* 4.0 1.5 1.68* 2.8 0.2 1.68* 3.4 0.1
Mechan & Elect 1.28* - - 1.68* - - 1.68* - - 1.68* - - 1.68* - -
Chem & Rubb 1.61* - - 1.42* - - 1.42* - - 0.00 - - 1.42* - -
Text & Leather 0.00 - - 0.00 - 6.0 0.00 - 14.0 0.00 - 20.2 0.51 - 29.2
Other Manuf 0.00 - - 1.26* - - 1.26* - - 1.33* - - 1.26* - -
Mining 1.43* - 2.6 1.37* - 2.6 1.22* - 0.8 1.33* 1.7 0.5 0.00 - 2.3
Hydrocarbons 1.43* 2.8 30.0 1.37* 3.9 16.5 1.22* - 8.0 1.33* 0.0 4.0 1.37* - -
Electricity 1.42 n.t n.t 1.34 n.t n.t 1.30 n.t n.t 1.09 n.t n.t 1.29 n.t n.t
Water 1.28 n.t n.t 1.28 n.t n.t 1.22 n.t n.t 1.20 n.t n.t 1.21 n.t n.t
Construction 1.17 n.t n.t 1.22 n.t n.t 1.13 n.t n.t 1.17 n.t n.t 1.20 n.t n.t
Transp &Comm 1.43* 8.5 21.0 1.37* 10.0 16.6 1.22* 9.2 17.0 1.33* 8.9 20.1 1.37* 12.5 17.6
Hot & Tourism 1.43* 15.2 46.4 1.37* 27.6 56.3 1.22* 26.8 56.3 1.33* 17.1 49.7 1.37* 26.2 48.0
Other Services 1.43* 43.2 - 1.37* 47.0 0.7 1.22* 43.2 2.5 1.33* 36.9 - 1.37* 52.2 2.9
Domestic Final
Demand 1.16 1.22 1.13 1.17 1.20
X = Optimal activity levels. (observed level = 1)  ,
* = Sectors with full capacity utilization.
B.T opt. = Optimal net exports in % of total optimal positive net exports  (a minus denotes a deficit)
B.T obs. = Observed net exports in % of total observed positive net exports  (a minus denotes a deficit)
n.t = non-tradable
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Table 3
Shadow prices of labor, capital and foreign trade deficit (1983-1996).
t w1 w2 W3 w4 w5 r e
1983 1.20 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 1.610 0.22 0.78
1984 1.16 2.050 2.050 2.050 2.050 2.050 0.17 0.77
1985 1.22 2.840 2.840 2.840 2.840 2.840 0.13 0.73
1986 1.24 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 0.14 0.77
1987 1.22 2.530 2.530 2.530 2.530 2.530 0.12 0.75
1988 1.20 1.860 1.890 1.890 1.890 1.890 0.16 0.78
1989 1.14 2.220 2.220 2.220 2.220 2.220 0.12 0.78
1990 1.13 2.960 2.960 2.960 2.960 2.960 0.09 0.75
1991 1.14 3.110 3.110 3.110 3.110 3.110 0.08 0.72
1992 1.15 3.140 3.140 3.140 3.140 3.140 0.10 0.73
1993 1.17 3.170 3.170 3.170 3.170 3.170 0.11 0.72
1994 1.20 3.170 3.360 3.360 3.360 3.360 0.10 0.69
1995 1.17 2.500 3.440 3.440 3.440 3.440 0.10 0.72
1996 1.20 2.370 3.410 3.410 3.410 3.410 0.13 0.73
                                   Units:  t is the optimal expansion of domestic final demand (the observed level equals 1),
                                               w1 to w5, the shadow prices of labor by level of qualification, are in 1000 DT / year,
                                               r is a weighted average of sectoral rates of return expressed in dinars of returns per dinar of capital stock,
                                               e, the shadow price of the trade deficit, is also in dinars per dinar of trade deficit.
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Table 4
Industrial distribution of the wage bill for qualified labor and rates of return on qualified labor (1983-1996).
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Agric & Fishing 23.5% 22.1% 21.4% 21.2% 20.9% 21.0% 20.4%
Food process 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 3.2% 3.4%
Const material 2.7% 2.7% 3.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Mechan & Elect 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.7%
Chem & Rubb 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0%
Text & Leather 13.1% 13.7% 12.3% 11.3% 10.4% 9.9% 9.6%
Other Manuf 3.3% 3.6% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
Mining 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
Hydrocarbons 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 1.5%
Electricity 3.2% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
Water 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
Construction 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5%
Transp &Comm 6.2% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.1% 6.2% 6.1%
Hot & Tourism 4.7% 4.5% 4.4% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.5%
Other Services 29.2% 30.3% 31.8% 33.1% 33.8% 33.6% 33.8%
Total wage bill for
qualified labor*
636.9 653.6 603.0 651.7 566.0 644.5 596.4
Total wage bill for
qualified labor
/GDP
7.5% 7.2% 6.5% 7.1% 5.9% 6.6% 5.9%
Average rate of
return  on
qualified labor
-66% -55% -31% -48% -32% -55% -42%
*Total wage bill for qualified labor: in 1,000,000 dinars of 1990
35
Table 4 (Con'd)
Industrial distribution of the wage bill for qualified labor and rates of return on qualified labor (1983-1996).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agric & Fishing 20.0% 19.3% 18.4% 18.2% 17.9% 17.3% 17.0%
Food process 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5%
Const material 2.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4%
Mechan & Elect 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.6%
Chem & Rubb 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.8% 2.8% 2.9%
Text & Leather 9.6% 9.9% 10.5% 10.4% 10.2% 9.8% 9.5%
Other Manuf 3.6% 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 4.2%
Mining 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Hydrocarbons 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2%
Electricity 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4%
Water 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
Construction 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.3%
Transp &Comm 6.0% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 5.8%
Hot & Tourism 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 4.3% 4.3% 4.7% 4.8%
Other Services 34.7% 35.6% 36.3% 36.2% 36.6% 37.0% 37.3%
Total wage bill for
qualified labor*
697.7 655.8 816.6 752.9 868.2 805.4 948.3
Total wage bill for
qualified labor
/GDP
6.5% 5.8% 6.7% 6.1% 6.8% 6.2% 6.8%
Average rate of
return  on
qualified labor
-31% -20% -32% -25% -29% -20% -30%
*Total wage bill for qualified labor:  in 1,000,000 dinars of 1990
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Table 5
Domestic Final Demand (D.F.D) growth by sources (%)
1983-1996 1983-1986* 1986-1991** 1991-1996***
D.F.D 1.90 -1.07 2.55 3.28
- L5
- L4
- L3
- L2
- L1
- Capital
- Deficit
0.16
0.27
0.31
2.36
0.43
-0.77
-0.85
0.21
0.25
0.42
3.03
1.27
-4.76
-1.48
0.08
0.16
0.49
3.08
1.26
-2.98
0.45
0.11
0.21
0.18
1.85
-0.88
2.98
-1.18
                                 *  6th five-year plan of development  (1982-1986)
                               **  7th five-year plan of development (1987-1991)
                             ***  8th five-year plan of development (1992-1996)
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